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Representative but irrelevant arguments in advertising 
Abstract 
A representative but irrelevant conditional is an if-then statement that implies, but does not logically 
establish, a link between evidence and a product claim. For example, in the argument "If kids are cramped, 
then they will start fighting. Model X has plenty of room. What's left to fight about?" the product claim (i.e., 
no fighting) does not follow from the conditional, which states what happens when there is a lack of 
space, but logically establishes nothing about what happens when there is plenty of space in a car. In a 
lab experiment, subjects exposed to an actual 30-second TV ad based their acceptance of the claim more 
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A representative but irrelevant conditional is an if-then statement that implies, but does 
not logically establish, a link between evidence and a product claim.  For example, in the 
argument “If kids are cramped, then they will start fighting.  Model X has plenty of room.  
What’s left to fight about?” the product claim (i.e., no fighting) does not follow from the 
conditional, which states what happens when there is a lack of space, but logically 
establishes nothing about what happens when there is plenty of space in a car. In a lab 
experiment, subjects exposed to an actual 30-second TV ad based their acceptance of the 
claim more on an irrelevant but representative conditional than on a conditional that 
logically linked the evidence to the claim.  
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The research reported below examines conditional (i.e., if-then) statements in advertising that 
apparently establish a logical connection between substantiating evidence (i.e., in the “if” 
part of the conditional) and a product claim (i.e., in the “then” part of the conditional), but 
actually invite illogical reasoning by message recipients.  Representative but irrelevant 
conditionals used in advertising are persuasive because the evidence is easy to imagine or 
visualise, seems plausible as a causal antecedent of the claim, and the scenario suggested by 
the argument is consistent with how message recipients are likely to remember previous 
consumption experiences.  Hence, the mental scenario represented by the conditional comes 
to mind more easily than alternative scenarios that would expose the illogical structure of the 
argument.   
 
For example, an actual 30-second television ad for LG washing machines shows a lone still 
washing machine surrounded by several violently shaking machines, with the voice over 
stating that: “A washing machine that shakes won’t last.  That’s why LG have designed a 
direct drive system giving greater balance and durability.”  In this context the term “balance” 
refers to the absence of shaking and “durability” refers to lasting a long time, the underlying 
structure of this argument is: 
 
Evidence: LG washing machines don’t shake. 
Conditional: If a washing machine shakes, it won’t last. 
Claim: LG washing machines will last. 
 
The claim that LG washing machines will last a long time does not follow from the evidence 
and conditional because washing machines can break down for reasons unrelated to shaking.  
The argument does not eliminate these possibilities. In terms of formal logic, the evidence 
states that the washing machine does not shake, whereas the conditional refers to what would 
happen if the machine did shake.  Since shaking is the opposite of not shaking, the 
conditional cannot logically establish anything about the claim.  However, the research 
reported below shows that consumers are vulnerable to accepting claims supported by 
representative but irrelevant conditionals.  A theatre test of an actual 30-second television ad 
shows a direct relationship between the acceptance of a representative but irrelevant 
conditional and the product claim.  This occurred even though message recipients were told 
to assess the logical structure of the argument, suggesting that consumers would be even 
more prone to this kind of illogical reasoning in a natural viewing context.  
 
 
Mental Models and Illogical Reasoning 
 
Johnson-Laird (1986) suggests that people generate “mental models” or scenarios of the 
various possibilities suggested by an argument when assessing its validity.  The LG ad 
evokes four mental models: (1) shakes and does not last, (2) shakes and lasts, (3) does not 
shake and does not last, and (4) does not shake and lasts.  Mental model 4 logically bolsters 
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this argument by affirming both the evidence and the claim.  Message recipients can refute 
the argument (i.e., judge it as invalid) if they generate and consider mental model 3, which 
affirms the evidence and denies the claim.  However, a considerable amount of research 
suggests that message recipients illogically consider mental models 1 and 2 to support and 
refute the argument, respectively (Areni, 2002).  Since both of these mental models deny the 
antecedent (i.e., state what happens to machines that shake), there is no logical conclusion 
that can follow if the LG Intellowasher does not shake (Johnson-Laird, 1986). 
 
However, by stating the antecedent “shakes”, the ad directs message recipients toward mental 
models 1 and 2 and away from models 3 and 4.  Shaking is a salient characteristic of washing 
machines (i.e., a noticeable aspect of their operation), and plausible as cause of a breakdown 
(i.e., as an indication of loose belts or other machine parts).  Moreover, the time-frame for the 
consequent “not lasting” is ambiguous.  How long after the onset of the antecedent “shaking” 
does a washing machine have to function to refute mental model 2?  If a shaking machine 
functioned perfectly for 49 loads, only to fail on the 50
th
, it is likely to be remembered as an 
instance of mental model 1 not 2.  So focusing attention on the first two mental models 
results in a persuasive, if invalid, argument because mental model 1 is more accessible than 
mental model 2. 
 
But why not present a valid argument by explicitly stating the relevant conditional (i.e., “a 
washing machine that doesn’t shake will last”)?  This has the effect of focusing attention on 
mental models 3 and 4, the two conditionals involving washing machines that do not shake.  
Since mental model 4 is likely to be the most typical outcome of using a washing machine 
(i.e., in most episodes a machine does not shake or breakdown), it is relatively easy to 
generate.  However, message recipients might also find it easy to generate model 3.  They 
can imagine scenarios where washing machines break down when there are other symptoms 
besides shaking, such as stalling mid-cycle, excessive leaking, failing to drain after the cycle, 
unusual noise during the main cycle, etc.  According to the mental models framework, these 
kinds of scenarios would render the argument invalid because the evidence (i.e., not shake) is 
affirmed but the consequence (i.e., last) is denied.   
 
So stating the representative but irrelevant conditional may be more effective than stating or 
implying the relevant conditional because it directs message recipients toward the mental 
models that make it difficult to refute the argument and away from the models where 
refutation would be easier.  Of course, a rival hypothesis is that consumers are logical in 
processing advertising claims.  Along these lines, the research reported below tests the 
competing hypotheses. 
 
H1:   Acceptance of the LG advertising claim is driven by the acceptance of the 
representative but irrelevant conditional having no logical connection to the evidence.     
H2:   Acceptance of the LG advertising claim is driven by the acceptance of the conditional 
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One hundred and sixteen post-graduate business students from a major Australian university, 
with ages ranging from 24 to 45, were placed in three groups of 30-40 in a theatre setting.  
Respondents were instructed that they would be presented with an actual 30-second 
television ad for a durable consumer product.  They were told to focus on the argument 
supporting the key claim, and to determine whether the evidence presented logically justified 
the claim.  Questionnaires containing the independent and dependent measures were then 
distributed.  After exposure to the ad, respondents were instructed to open the questionnaire 
and were given 2 minutes to complete the items.  
 
The experimental stimulus was the actual 30-second television advertisement for the LG 
Intellowasher, which was shown on a large screen at the front of the theatre.  The 
advertisement begins with a 30-35 year old male in a white lab coat entering a large open 
space with 7 washing machines sitting atop 20 foot columns.  Six of the washing machines 
are shaking noticeably, but the one in the middle remains still.  A male voiceover then states 
that “a washing machine that shakes won’t last.”  At this point, all 6 shaking machines begin 
to topple from their columns leaving only the one in the middle.  The actor in the lab coat 
shakes his head and begins making notes on his clip board.  The voiceover continues “That’s 
why LG have designed a direct drive system giving greater balance and durability,” at which 
point the actor looks up at the remaining washing machine and smiles.  The voiceover 
concludes with the slogan “LG – life’s good.”  The basic structure of this ad is typical of 
evidence-based TV commercials (see Preston, 1977).  
 
All of the subjective probability measures were contained on a single page.  As demonstrated 
above, the copy from the ad was decomposed into the fundamental claim, evidence, and 
conditional comprising the argument.  Each proposition was then presented as a 
questionnaire item.  The item corresponding to the claim stated “The LG Intellowasher will 
last a long time”, the item related to the evidence stated “The LG washing machine will not 
shake,” and the item to the representative but irrelevant conditional was “If a washing 
machine shakes, it won’t last”.  In order to measure agreement with the corresponding 
relevant conditional, the contracted negation in the consequent of the irrelevant conditional 
(i.e., won’t) was moved to the antecedent (i.e., doesn’t), resulting in the statement “If a 
washing machine doesn’t shake, it will last”.  Respondents reported their acceptance of each 
proposition by circling the appropriate number on 11-point scales anchored by “Not at all 
likely” (0) and “Extremely likely” (10), as used by Wyer for similar research into logical and 
illogical reasoning in response to arguments (Wyer, 1970; Wyer and Goldberg, 1970).  The 
order of the propositions was altered to create six versions of the questionnaire.  Preliminary 
analyses revealed that question order did not influence acceptance of the four propositions, so 
results were aggregated over the six versions.   
 
 
Results, Analysis, and Conclusion 
 
Respondents generally accepted the propositions corresponding to LG ad.  As shown in 
Table 1, the means for the acceptance of the evidence (M = 7.52), the claim (M = 6.45), the 
representative but irrelevant conditional (M = 5.90) and the relevant conditional (M = 5.63) 
were all above the mid-point of the scale, although only slightly so in the case of the two 
Page 5 of 7 ANZMAC 2010  
 
conditionals. Paired comparisons revealed little or no mean difference in acceptance of the 
two conditionals (t 1,115 < 1).  In order to test hypotheses 1 and 2, multiple regression analysis 
was conducted.  Acceptance of the evidence, the relevant conditional, and the representative 
but irrelevant conditional were the predictors in the model and acceptance of the claim was 
the dependent variable.  As shown in Figure 1, acceptance of the evidence was not significant 
as a predictor of claim acceptance (β = 0.09, t1,112 = 1.33, p < .19, partial R
2
 = .02).  In other 
words, acceptance of the claim that the washing machine will last was not driven by how 
much recipients believed it did not shake.  This may, in part, reflect the limited range of the 
responses.  All of the respondents rated acceptance of the evidence at 6 or higher on the 0 – 
10 scale.  However, acceptance of the representative but irrelevant conditional was predictive 
of claim acceptance (β = 0.43, t1,112 = 5.44, p < .0001, partial R
2
 = .25), supporting hypothesis 
1, and acceptance of the relevant conditional was not (β = .04, t1,112 < 1), refuting hypothesis 
2. 
   
Table 1 - Means and Standard Deviations for the Beliefs Related to the LG Intellowasher Argument 
Proposition Corresponding Statement  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Evidence “The LG Intellowasher will not shake” 7.52 2.47 
Claim “The LG Intellowasher will last a long time.” 6.45 2.13 
Irrelevant 
Conditional 
“If a washing machine shakes, it won’t last.”  5.90 2.90 
Relevant 
Conditional 
“If a washing machine doesn’t shake, it will last.”  5.63 3.06 
 
 
Figure 1 - Regression Results Showing which Beliefs Predicted Claim Acceptance 
 
 










These results indicate that respondents based acceptance of the claim that the machine will 
last on acceptance of the representative but irrelevant conditional.  This occurred even though 
they were told to “determine whether the evidence presented logically justified the 
Evidence 
“The LG Intellowasher will not shake.” 
 
Irrelevant Conditional 
“If a washing machine shakes, it won’t last.” 
Relevant Conditional 
“If a washing machine doesn’t shake, it will last.” 
Claim 
“The LG Intellowasher will last a long time.” 
β = 0.04, t1,112 < 1, partial R
2
 = .00 
 β = 0.43, t1,112 = 5.44, p < .0001, partial R
2 = .25 
   β = 0.09, t1,112 = 1.33, p < .19, partial R
2 = .02 
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conclusion”, and they were presented with a relevant conditional establishing a logical 
relationship between the evidence and the claim.  The representative but irrelevant 
conditional was not any more believable than the relevant conditional; it was simply relied on 
more heavily to determine acceptance of the claim. 
  
Although much advertising relies on implicit forms of persuasion involving simple 
associations, symbolism, imagery, humour, figures of speech, and music, some advertising is 
argument-based (Areni, 2002), with aspects of the execution designed to facilitate acceptance 
of a key product claim.  The research reported above suggests that consumers may be limited 
in their ability to evaluate arguments in advertising, and that copywriters understand and 
exploit these shortcomings.  Keep in mind that the copywriters could have constructed a 
logical argument using the relevant conditional that “a washing machine that doesn’t shake 
will last”.  Indeed, the visual elements of the argument demonstrate both conditionals – the 
washing machines that shake do not last, and the washing machine that does not shake lasts.  
All other elements in the ad could have remained exactly the same, with the relevant 
conditional uttered by the voiceover instead of the representative but irrelevant conditional.  
This research suggests that the copywriters made a wise decision and offers an explanation 
for why this is the case. 
          
However, there are at least two alternative explanations for the results reported above, both 
of which stem from the use of an actual 30-second television ad featuring a well-known 
brand in a familiar product category.  First, respondents could have based their acceptance of 
the claim on previous experiences and word-of-mouth regarding LG washing machines, other 
LG products, and washing machines in general.  So, acceptance of the claim might be driven 
by the belief that LG makes reliable products, or that washing machines in general last a long 
time, rather than anything said in the ad.  The second explanation for these results is an 
extension of the first.  Rather than reasoning solely from prior knowledge, respondents may 
have integrated the stated propositions with existing knowledge to generate new propositions 
(Cherubini et al., 1998; Moore, 1986).  This seems particularly likely in an advertising 
setting, where message recipients assume that they are to expand on what is actually said in 
evaluating product claims (Preston and Scharbach, 1971).  So, for example, the “direct drive” 
mechanism referred to in the ad implies the absence of belts.  If a respondent believed that 
shaking stems from loose belts, then the evidence should be quite persuasive.  But if a 
respondent linked shaking to the timing mechanism, then the implied absence of belts would 
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